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5  Legal Metanormativity
LESSONS FOR AND FROM CONSTITUTIVIST ACCOUNTS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
Kathryn Lindeman*
I.  The Metanormative Ambitions of Metaethics
Philosophers working in metaethics are gripped by questions about how we think, talk, and 
come to know facts about ethics and morality and what the nature of its domain could be, 
given answers to these questions. It is increasingly clear to many that the features of the eth-
ical domain that make these questions so gripping extend beyond it to other domains that 
might also be properly thought of as normative, dealing with questions not merely of how 
things are, but of how they ought to be.
This recognition of normativity outside of ethics puts pressure on metaethicists to attend 
to other normative domains to ensure that their answers to metaethical questions can be 
extended to provide a natural unified explanation of normative phenomena wherever they 
occur. Many metaethicists are, then, in the process of turning their sights to see whether their 
accounts of the metaethical could be extended to metanormative accounts more generally.1
 * Thanks to Gwen Bradford, Eric Brown, Jill Denton, Billy Dunaway, Chad Flanders, Julia Haas, Sophie 
Horowitz, Richard Kim, Charlie Kurth, Frank Lovett, Ian MacMullen, Brooke McLane- Higginson, Kranti 
Saran, Lizzie Schecter, George Sher, Tim Schroeder, Julia Staffel, Brian Talbot, Kevin Toh, Eric Wiland, and 
audiences at Washington University in Saint Louis, Rice University, and Ashoka University for helpful discus-
sion of and feedback on the arguments in this chapter.
 1 Though what distinguishes normative domains is a matter of controversy, many agree that a domain is norma-
tive when it can be understood in terms of reasons. The question “is domain D normative” often is thought 
to be settled by the answer to the question “are the dictates of domain D reason- giving?”So, Foot’s example 
of sexist club rules would not be normative on this account, because they do not give us reason to accord 
with them, while the rules of prudence might, though they would not themselves be dictates of ethics. (Foot 
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It is unsurprising, then, that the domain of legality has increasingly come to the atten-
tion of metaethicists. Though metaethicists interested in expanding their account beyond 
the ethical domain typically focus on the theoretical or epistemic domain, the legal domain 
has characteristic prescriptive reason- giving normativity that the epistemic domain is often 
thought to lack.2 Unlike the epistemic domain, it is inherently practical, and so has features 
that make it plausibly reason- giving. Because of its reason- giving and evaluative features, 
the legal domain is a clear candidate for explanation from metanormative extensions of 
metaethical accounts. It seems important, then, that any metaethical account must be ex-
tendable to include an account of the legal domain.3 However, it complicates matters to 
include the legal domain among those domains that a metanormative theory is beholden to 
explain. The greater the number of normative domains and the more diverse their subject 
matter and normative features, the more sophisticated the metanormative account of them 
must be. However, one promising metaethical account that seems poised to extend to ac-
count for diverse normative domains is constitutivism.
Metaethical constitutivism is a reductive account that takes the constitutive features 
of some ethical kind to explain or ground the normative ethical facts. So, for example, 
Korsgaard seeks to explain the reasons agents have (a normative ethical fact) by appeal to the 
claimed fact that agents are by nature self- constituting, and agents have reasons to do things 
that would further the success of this constitutive activity.4 The heavy lifting for constitutive 
theories is in explaining the constitutive features that all kind- members in a domain share 
and how that constitutive feature grounds the normative features of the domain. I think of 
these tasks as the Extension Task and the Norm Explanation Task, respectively.
These two tasks also constrain the metanormative constitutivist’s account of normativity 
generally. The constitutivist’s account of normativity must explain the extension of norma-
tive domains generally, a correlate of the Extension Task. In addition, the metanormative 
constitutivist must have the resources to explain the distinctive normative features of each 
normative domain. So, depending on the set of domains to be explained by the generalized 
constitutivist account, which I  will call the Metanormative Constitutivist account, the 
constitutivists’ task will vary in difficulty. It seems that the more diversity there is in the 
normative features across domains, the greater the problems for the constitutivist in pro-
viding a unified account. So, the metaethical constitutivist with unifying aspirations has an 
1972) Considerations of parsimony might lead us to reject this understanding, because many domains that 
might strike us as having important commonalities with ethics that metanormativity seeks to understand are 
ruled out on this account. Epistemology, for example, if you are to follow Kolodny, is not normative on this 
conception because it is not reason- giving in the right way. Pace Kolodny, in “Why Be Rational?” Mind (2005), 
I think this result should lead us to reject this reasons- basic understanding of normativity, rather than reject 
epistemology as normative. For readers who are primarily interested in the reason- givingness of the legal do-
main, I direct them to Enoch’s (2011) “Reason Giving and the Law” that argues that the reasons given by laws 
are triggering reasons, which bring about conditional reasons.
 2 See, for example, (Wedgwood 2002, 267– 297). and (Velleman 2000, 244– 81) Kate Nolfi, who calls this view, 
in epistemology, at least “Normativism” see her: (2015) “How to Be a Normativist About the Nature of Belief.”.
 3 Alternately, the metaethicist could provide an Error Theory of the normativity of the legal domain consistent 
with her general metanormative account.
 4 See (Korsgaard 2009). For other prominent examples of constitutivists, see (Velleman 2000), (Smith 2013), and 
(Katsafanas 2013).
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additional burden: to show that her metaethical story generalizes in some principled way 
to a metanormative constitutivist account according to which we can understand specific 
constitutivist accounts in other normative domains.
In this chapter, I  look to the legal domain which is both plausibly normative and prac-
tical, and in which there are currently accounts that take the general shape of constitutivist 
explanations I sketched above. I’ll look at one such account, Scott Shapiro’s, and see how 
far understanding its strengths and working to avoid its weaknesses can get us toward 
completing these tasks for the metaethical constitutivist.
II.  The Planning Theory of Legal Normativity
In many plausibly normative domains, there are already existing constitutivist- esque ac-
counts that take the nature of individuals in that domain to explain the plausibly normative 
features of that domain. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are current positions in the philosophy 
of law literature that take the general shape of a constitutivist account, grounding the norma-
tive features of the legal domain in the nature of laws themselves.5 This sets the metaethical 
constitutivist up to incorporate an existing constitutivist account of legal normativity into 
her metanormative account.6 Here I’ll focus on one account with a constitutivist form re-
cently developed by Scott Shapiro to identify a type of problem faced by constitutivist ac-
counts of the legal domain and what lessons metanormative constitutivists can glean from 
its struggles.
Shapiro’s account is one of the more interesting recent attempts to ground law’s normative 
features in an account of its function.7 Shapiro’s Planning Theory of Law explains normative 
facts in the law by appealing to the necessary features of the law itself. His account has two 
general constitutive requirements on being a legal institution. First, developing a position 
found in the philosophy of action in the work of Michael Bratman, Shapiro understands a 
 5 This is, of course, not the only position in current and historical philosophy of law. It is, of course, possible to 
deny that there are normative features of the legal domain. It is also possible to explain the normative features 
by appeal to those of other normative domains, (e.g., the domain of morality), or from the activities of other 
normatively authoritative beings (e.g., the commands of dieties). Regardless, each of these forms could produce 
a unified metanormative account, provided the same sort of explanation held of other normative domains. 
What is at issue, then, seems to be whether the legal domain is itself the source of its own normative features, or 
whether the existence of legal normativity is dependent on the existence of ethical normativity or divine nor-
mativity, or perhaps pragmatic normativity, if such a thing exists. There are many interesting questions that turn 
on this that are beyond the scope of the chapter here.
 6 I’m understanding, “metanormative accounts” to be those that explain, in general, how domains have their nor-
mative features, and particular accounts then specify how that metanormative account applies in specific cases. 
So, e.g., metaethical accounts explain how the ethical domain has the normative features it has, and accounts 
of how the legal domain explain how legal domains have their normative features. A particular metaethical and 
legal account can have the same form, e.g., can both be constitutivist accounts, and thus both fall under the same 
metanormative account.
 7 Shapiro’s account is certainly not alone here. See, for example, (Ehrenberg 2015, 247– 266). I focus on Shapiro 
because his book- length treatment lays out the constitutive features of the legal domain and accounts for both 
how those constitutive features are had and how those features generate norms. It is, to my knowledge, the most 
explicit and recent development of a full constitutivist legal account.
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legal institution as characterized by the Planning Thesis: as social organizations that create, 
carry out, and enforce social plans. Legal activity, for Shapiro, is thus activity of a sort of so-
cial planning. Shapiro writes that “legal institutions plan for the communities over whom 
they claim authority, both by telling their members what they may or may not do and by 
authorizing some of these members to plan for others.”8 Certain complex social arrangements 
lead to what Shapiro calls the “circumstances of legality,” situations in which the manage-
ment of predictability, compensation for ignorance and bad character, and accountability are 
needed.9 According to Shapiro, in these circumstances of legality, social planning is needed 
to set communal standards for behavior via publicly accessible standards. This is the sort of 
planning that legal institutions are constitutively engaged in as a matter of actual practice. 
Any institution, in order to be a legal institution, must be engaged in such planning activity.
However, engagement in planning activity is not sufficient to constitute a legal system 
on Shapiro’s account. To fully account for the constitutive requirements of legal systems, 
Shapiro supplements the Planning Thesis with what he calls the Moral Aim Thesis. The 
Moral Aim Thesis states that “the fundamental aim of legal activity is to remedy the moral 
deficiencies of the circumstances of legality.”10 There are institutions that engage in pla-
nning activity of the sort the Planning Thesis constitutively attributes to legal institutions 
and yet are not legal institutions (e.g., the Mafia). On Shapiro’s account, these institutions 
are not legal institutions because they do not have the constitutive moral aim that all legal 
institutions have. Though many planning institutions coordinate social activity, “only a legal 
system is supposed to address those problems that less sophisticated methods of coordinating 
social activity and guiding action are unable to resolve.”11
So, the two constitutive requirements on a legal institution are characterized by the 
Planning Thesis and the Moral Aim Thesis. Legal institutions must be engaged in a charac-
teristic type of planning activity and they must have a moral aim. The Planning Thesis only 
requires that legal institutions actually engage in planning activity, and so accounting for 
this requirement only requires that we can determine what an institution does. Determining 
whether an institution has a moral aim is more difficult. Shapiro recognizes that many legal 
institutions fail to achieve their moral aims, and some might even fail to attempt to achieve 
their moral aims. So he doesn’t require that legal institution actually achieve moral ends. 
Instead, he holds that “what makes the law the law is that it has a moral aim, not that it 
satisfies that aim.”12 Together, on Shapiro’s view, these two constitutive features are shared by 
all legal institutions and can be used to explain the normative features of the legal domain.
Shapiro develops this view to account for Extension (ruling in all and only pre- theoretical 
legal institutions) and Norm Explanation (accounting for the normative features of the do-
main). The Moral Aim Thesis serves both tasks for Shapiro. It helps explain why the Mafia 
and Yakuza aren’t legal institutions, despite being planning institutions, and it helps explain 
 8 (Shapiro 2015, 195).
 9 (Shapiro 2015, 200).
 10 (Shapiro 2015, 213),
 11 (Shapiro 2015, 214).
 12 (Shapiro 2015, 212). The explanation for how an institution counts as having this constitutive aim is, as yet, 
unexplained. We’ll return to this shortly.
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the normative features that govern legal officials. The Planning Thesis, with its behavioral 
constraint, and the Moral Aim Thesis with its teleological constraint, together generate an 
account of not only what the law is, but also what it should be, and importantly for Shapiro, 
how it should be used. He writes “the law is, in the end, an instrument [. . .] and as with all 
instruments, there are correct and incorrect ways to use the law; if we use it incorrectly, it will 
not do what it is supposed to do and authorities will not do what they are entitled to do.”13
III.  The Moral Aim Thesis and the Extension Task
Shapiro takes legal officials to be accountable for the accomplishments of the law as well as 
its uses. The demand to explain these normative features makes Shapiro’s Moral Aim Thesis 
an obviously appealing constitutive requirement for legal institutions. By appealing to the 
moral aim of law, Shapiro takes himself to be able to explain how those who make and apply 
laws are also under moral and other practical constraints because of the nature of law.
However, explaining a domain’s normative features by appeal to a constitutive feature 
requires a successful account of how that feature is constitutive of the domain. So, a suit-
able metaphysical account must be given to explain both how the members of a normative 
domain have this feature and to show that all members of the normative domain in question 
have that feature. So, how can we tell whether a system has a moral aim, and how can we be 
sure that all legal systems are going to have such an aim?
On Shapiro’s view, we can determine whether an institution is a planning institution 
by looking to what the institution does, but this same strategy can’t be used to determine 
whether an institution has a moral aim. The constitutive requirement is having a moral aim, 
not engaging in any activity that would satisfy or accomplish this aim. Additionally, having 
the moral aim cannot require satisfaction of the aim, and similarly cannot require minimal 
satisfaction.14
Without a satisfactory account of how legal institutions have their constitutive features, 
an account cannot succeed in grounding the normative features of the legal domain. One 
might hope that the Moral Aim Thesis could be accounted for by appeal to the intentions of 
its designers as is often thought to work for artifacts. Artifacts occupy a plausibly normative 
domain where the activities of designers seem to determine the domain’s normative facts. 
Because there is a long tradition of understanding legal institutions as particularly complex 
social artifacts, this route might seem particularly appealing.
However, the turn to artifacts for this work is already concerning to some. Leiter, for ex-
ample, has worried that legal creators cannot seem to do the metaphysical work that artifac-
tual creators do.
Often, for artifacts that have identifiable human creators, we appeal to the intentions 
of the creator, and that works well as long as we have other theoretical reasons for 
treating the creator’s intention as metaphysically decisive. [.  .  .] Such considerations 
 13 (Shapiro 2015, 399).
 14 For an argument for this general position, see (Lindeman 2017).
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will not help, in any case, with law, at least for positivists, since law need not have a 
creator who intended to create it (think of custom as a source of law, among many 
other examples). But when we untether artifacts from creators, functions seem hostage 
to rather variable interests in that artifact. [. . .] I am not aware of a single, widely ac-
cepted analysis of the essential properties of any artifact that does not rely on appeal to 
intentions of the creator in a context where it seems we should defer to those. If there 
is one, I would like to hear it.15
Leiter takes this to be a decisive reason to reject all functional accounts of legal norma-
tivity, but here we need to focus on the more fundamental worry: that legal institutions are 
more varied than an appeal to any shared creator intention could account for. If we searched 
for one intention that all legal officials shared that could account for the legal nature of their 
creation, we would come up empty- handed. Shapiro recognizes this, and so instead appeals 
not to legal officials’ actual intentions or aims, but to their avowed intentions and aims.
Shapiro thinks we can account for legal institutions having constitutive moral aims 
without falling into the trouble Leiter raises. Instead of appealing to the actual intentions or 
aims of legal officials, he appeals to their activities to account for the constitutive moral aim 
of legal institutions. Specifically, he states that in order for an organization to have a moral 
aim (and thus to be a legal institution), the high- ranking officials of that organization must 
avow that the organization has a moral aim.16 This can be done explicitly and implicitly in 
speeches, preambles to formative documents, such as constitutions, prologues to legal codes, 
and judicial dicta. It is thus a necessary condition on an institution having a moral aim, on 
Shapiro’s account, that its officials use moral discourse to frame their activities.17
Shapiro thus writes “[t] he law possesses the aim that it does because high- ranking officials 
represent the practice as having a moral aim or aims. Their avowals need not be sincere, but 
they must be made.”18 So, it is a condition on something’s being a legal institution that its 
high- ranking officials represent it as having a moral aim. This, it seems, is supposed to ac-
count for the law having that represented aim, which could then serve to ground the nor-
mative facts in the legal domain. Importantly, however, the transition from the claim that 
high- ranking legal officials avow particular aims to the position that the relevant legal 
institutions have those aims presupposes some principle such as Aim Transfer.
Aim Transfer: When an individual or set of individuals with creative control over some 
system or item profess to have aim x, the system or item thereby has aim x in virtue of that 
profession.
 15 (Leiter ms, 5– 6).
 16 (Shapiro 2011, 217).
 17 Recently, David Plunkett has challenged Shapiro to account for how the Moral Aim Thesis is fully compat-
ible with the positivist commitment, as Shapiro claims. On this objection the account of the law that Shapiro 
gives seems to import moral material to account for normative evaluations of law in ways Shapiro seems com-
mitted to avoiding. It isn’t clear to me that Shapiro has made this mistake, but in any event, my own objec-
tion to Shapiro differs from and is prior to Plunkett’s. See his “Legal Positivism and the Moral Aim Thesis” 
(2013, 1– 43).
 18 (Plunkett 2013, 216– 217).
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Aim Transfer avoids the under- accounting problems that resulted from making aims 
turn on either sincerely held or fully or partially satisfied aims. Unfortunately, because Aim 
Transfer is highly implausible as a general principle, it will do no better at accounting for how 
legal systems have constitutive moral aims.
To see how odd Aim Transfer is, consider what commitments we must take on to en-
dorse it in other cases. Suppose propaganda is information disseminated with the function 
of shaping the views of consumers in ways not sensitive to the truth.19 A good propagan-
dist is often someone who successfully represents their propaganda as having the aim of 
disseminating clearly presented truths, and this might involve insincere avowals that the 
information is being conveyed with the aim of informing consumers about the truth. But, 
representing propaganda as legitimate unbiased information does not thereby give it that 
function. Its actual function remains to mislead or otherwise lead the consumers to believe 
what the propagandist wants, independently of whether it is accurate or best supported by 
all the evidence.
If by making insincere avowals, I deceive others into thinking I  run a legitimate news 
organ ization with the aim of disseminating unbiased information, it does not thereby 
become a legitimate news organization with this aim.20 However, according to Aim Transfer, 
my organization would have the aim of disseminating unbiased information. But this is 
implausible; propaganda cannot become news so easily.
This inability of propaganda to become news via mere avowals should help us see why a 
possible supplement to Aim Transfer will not help. Even if we were to supplement it with an 
uptake requirement, according to which the avowed aim only transfers when others believe 
the avowal. In the case of propaganda, however, we can see that the propaganda does not be-
come news when it succeeds in convincing others that it is news. Even with this strengthening, 
Aim Transfer cannot account for how things with authors or creators have aims.
We shouldn’t be surprised that avowals of legal officials would be unable to account for the 
aims of legal systems. Even in the case of artifact designers, we don’t think their claims are of 
metaphysical significance. Of course, the claims of both artifact designers and legal officials 
could be defeasible evidence that they are engaged in an activity that might be involved in 
the transfer of an aim. Shapiro relies on the avowals of legal officials to account for the moral 
aim of legal systems. However, even though it is perhaps plausible that all legal systems will 
have officials who avow moral aims, accounting for the Moral Aim Thesis via Aim Transfer 
does not work.21
If all legal institutions have a constitutive moral aim, something other than the claims of 
high- ranking legal officials must be at work to account for it. What seemed to be a promising 
 19 I’m not here attempting to develop a sophisticated account of propaganda; the analysis given here is only 
meant to be a plausible one. Any analysis that similarly takes propaganda to be the sort of thing that a) is not 
news, and b) can be falsely presented as news, will serve my purposes just as well.
 20 Plunkett presents an alternate to the Moral Aim Thesis he calls the Represented as Moral Thesis: “It is that legal 
activity involves at least the different forms of surface- level moral presentation identified by that organization 
meeting the moral- representation criteria (or some slightly revised version of them).” (Plunkett, 2013, 33) This 
criticism, I think, holds against Plunkett’s revision, offered to be more palatable to positivists.
 21 I grant that it is plausible because no matter how plausible, it does not do the needed metaphysical work. 
Despite this, I am convinced by (Plunkett 2013) that it is not, actually, particularly plausible.
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answer to Leiter’s worry about what might account for constitutive features of law as an arti-
fact seems to not appropriately account for the functions the Planning Theory attributes to 
it. So, Shapiro seems not to have provided the metaphysical account needed to support the 
Moral Aim Thesis.
IV.  The Moral Aim Thesis and Norm Explanation
Given the difficulty faced in accounting for the Moral Aim Thesis, it is worth revisiting why 
Shapiro is interested in this thesis. Shapiro takes it to be important for meeting the two 
primary tasks facing constitutivist accounts:  the Extension and Norm Explanation tasks. 
First, as we noted above, the Moral Aim Thesis is directly involved in ensuring the Planning 
Account gives an accurate extension of legal systems. Without the Moral Aim Thesis, ac-
cording to Shapiro, the Japanese Yakuza or Sicilian Mafia and similarly advanced criminal 
organizations that perform planning functions laid out in the Planning Thesis would count 
as legal institutions.22 Second, in order to satisfy Norm Explanation, the legal constitutivist 
must account for all the normative features in the legal domain by appeal to its constitutive 
features. These normative features should include the types of criticism Shapiro takes to be 
appropriate in the legal domain. He thinks that we believe that legal systems that are unable 
to solve serious moral problems are criticizable, while we do not make similar judgments 
about all systems. Moreover, he believes we make moral appraisals of legal officials and make 
prescriptive judgments about how law- users ought to behave and what lawmakers are entitled 
to do. If the legal institution has a moral aim, then via some transfer principle, Shapiro thinks 
that there will be constraints on how we ought to use, bring about, and act in the light of the 
moral aim of legal institutions.
The two motivations for endorsing the Moral Aim Thesis thus align with the Extension 
and the Norm Explanation tasks that we saw all constitutivist accounts were tasked with. 
Shapiro takes these tasks to require something like the Moral Aim Thesis, and yet we saw 
that Aim Transfer was not a suitable foundation for the Moral Aim Thesis. If Shapiro is 
right, legal constitutivists need another way to account for the constitutive moral aim of legal 
institutions. However, given the difficulty Shapiro has accounting for the Moral Aim Thesis, 
it might be useful to consider whether the Moral Aim Thesis would successfully account for 
these additional normative features.
It seems that the normative features of the legal domain Shapiro is considering include 
those concerning what ends the law should be put to, what counts as a correct or incorrect 
use, and what legal authorities are entitled to do. Moreover, Shapiro seems to think that this 
is a general account that can be appealed to in artifactual cases more generally, such that 
when one knows what an instrument is for, one is in a position to know how one ought to 
use it and what one is entitled to do with it.
We’ve already seen reason to be suspicious that aims, moral or otherwise, can be transferred 
from avowed aims of creators or authorities. The principle Shapiro needs here is different. In 
this case, the aim or function of some artifact or system is supposed to transfer to its user 
 22 (Plunkett 2013, 215).
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or designer, to account for their normative constraints. Shapiro’s explanation of normative 
evaluations seems to rely on something like Norm Transfer:
Norm Transfer: When someone is using, creating, or otherwise interacting with some 
functionally understood individual thing, they are thereby assessible, according practical 
norms determined by the function of that thing.
There are some attempts in the metaethics literature to argue that the normative features 
of constitutive kinds constrain the reasons or norms that designers or users of those kinds are 
bound by. Korsgaard, for instance, argues that the constitutive function of a house constrains 
the reasons that housebuilders have.23 On her view, housebuilders have reasons to build 
houses that are good at sheltering because houses are for sheltering. In explaining this con-
nection, Korsgaard appeals to a further commitment that Shapiro has denied himself in his 
explanation of the Moral Aim Thesis: that if housebuilders were not actually aiming to make 
something good at sheltering, then they would not be building a house at all. Korsgaard 
believes that individuals undertaking to create something with a constitutive function must 
be guided by the kind’s norms in order to count as making something with that function.If 
you build something sufficiently bad at the norms of houses, you are not building a house, 
and if you are not aiming at building a house, you are not performing the characteristic ac-
tivity of housebuilding, and so you are not a housebuilder. So, the conclusion is supposed to 
be that if you are a housebuilder, you are already engaged in an enterprise governed by the 
aims of housebuilding, because you are already aiming at building a shelter when you under-
take to build a house. So, as a housebuilder, you have reason to build houses that are good at 
serving the function of houses. There is a sort of existential risk in not so aiming: you could 
cease being a housebuilder.24
However, this explanation of the norms governing tool- users or designers seems to re-
quire they actually have the relevant aim. Because Shapiro does not think legal officials nec-
essarily have a moral aim, this sort of account is not open to him. Shapiro takes high- ranking 
legal officials to have their status as legal officials in virtue of institutional features, rather 
than in virtue of their legal activities (as Korsgaard thinks housebuilders have their status as 
housebuilders). No legal official is a legal official in virtue of their good performance of legal 
activities, or in virtue of having a moral aim. So there is no existential risk in being a very bad 
legal official on Shapiro’s planning account.
In accepting Norm Transfer, it seems we would need to think (implausibly) that the 
natures of tools bind their users and creators with norms to further their functions.25 We can 
accept that there are correct and incorrect ways to use a tool and facts about what the tool is 
supposed to do without thinking that has anything to do with what a tool- user is entitled to 
use it for or what others can rightfully demand of tool designers or users. For example, I have 
done nothing essentially criticizable when I use a teacup as a potter for a plant, despite it not 
being the function of the teacup to hold a plant. I have done the right thing when I dismantle 
 23 For this argument, see (Korsgaard 2009) Chapter 2.
 24 I  think there are good reasons that one should reject this sort of story, independent of the considerations 
addressed here. For an argument against the identification of the real and the (minimally) good at the heart of 
this view, see (Lindeman 2017).
 25 We would, that is, need to think that in creating artifacts we normatively enslave ourselves to them.
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the bomb, rather than permit it to fulfill its function of exploding when on a crowded public 
street. If I am designing a pocketknife, I am not criticizable for sacrificing optimal func-
tionality for cost- effectiveness. I need not even be criticizable for sacrificing optimal func-
tionality for my lunch break, though you might disagree if you are my boss. In general, that 
something has an aim or a function does not imply that it is criticizable to use it for another 
(even contrary) purpose. That something has an aim or a function does not require that any 
particular person be co- opted into the furtherance of that function or aim. That something 
has a function or an aim doesn’t even seem to demand of designers that they try to make an 
excellent instance of that kind of thing.
Even if we could establish the Moral Aim Thesis, it doesn’t seem that it could do most of 
what Shapiro wants it for anyway, because Norm Transfer is false. Absent an explanation like 
the one provided by Norm Transfer, it’s hard to see what could account for the Moral Aim 
Thesis explaining the practical norms governing legal officials and other individuals under 
the legal institution. Moral aims, even if we could account for them as a constitutive feature 
of legal institutions, don’t seem to account for the practical constraints on those who are en-
gaged in designing or being governed by them as simply as an artifactual account might have 
led us to think.
V.  Planning Functions Without Moral Aims
Without Norm Transfer, it’s thus unlikely that the Moral Aim Thesis will allow us to account 
for the practical norms governing legal officials as we might want. Even if we could find a 
way, other than Aim Transfer, to account for the Moral Aim Thesis, it doesn’t seem to pro-
vide the constitutivists with everything they wanted. We could then, following Leiter, reject 
appeal to a constitutive function or aim of legal institutions to understand the normativity 
of the legal domain. First, however, the metanormative constitutivist would do well to take a 
step further back and consider whether there is another way to understand what artifactual 
normativity could look like.
So far, we saw Shapiro’s Planning Theory involved two constitutive components 
characterized in the Planning Thesis and the Moral Aim Thesis. The first required actual 
planning behavior in order to be a legal system. This constitutive feature involved actual per-
formance or properties (e.g., actually performing planning functions). The second required 
having a moral aim in order to be a legal system. This constitutive feature involved the claims 
of a creator (e.g., the avowed aims of legal officials). However, these two accounts do not ex-
haust the ways that functions and aims can be had by individuals or kinds.
This is where the metanormative constitutivist might turn her sights to other domains in 
which functional accounts are used to explain plausibly normative features. An ecumenical 
account of normativity might involve not only explicitly practical domains such as morality 
and legality, or the reason- involving, which would presumably include the epistemic, but 
also include all domains in which deontic judgments are apt: not just the artifactual, but also 
the biological, and plausibly the aesthetic.
If we recognize domains in which metanormative constitutivists must account for nor-
mative features without recourse to designers at all, we are emboldened to look beyond Aim 
Transfer and the activities of legal officials to account for the normativity of the legal domain. 
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The biological domain, for instance, involves no designers who transfer their aims. There are 
many facts in the biological domain that involve normative assessment, despite their failure 
to be grounded in the intentions of any designer. Despite lacking a designer, we think livers 
ought to filter toxins from the blood, that plants are harmed by acid rain, that hearts too 
weak to adequately circulate blood are bad hearts. These are all claims that are true because 
of the nature of the biological kinds in the subject. There are function claims that underpin 
each of these assessments, and we need not abandon them for lack of a designer.
We no longer think that explanations of biological organisms must appeal to a creator whose 
intentional designs gave organs their functions, yet we understand eyes functionally. Eyes have 
the function of seeing, and my eyes have this function independently of my own use or interest 
in their having this function. They also have this function independently of how well or badly 
suited they are to perform this function or whether they are currently being used to see. They 
have this function because, independently of any intentionally directed intervention, they were 
created in a process selected to give a form that was suited to serve the function of seeing.26 
Similarly, we can understand the norms of eyes as coming from this function. Eyes ought to be 
sensitive to light, to present accurate images of visually perceivable phenomena, etc.
In in the philosophy of biology neither actual behavior nor creator intentions or claims are 
needed to explain etiological proper function.
For some activity or effect, Z, to be the etiological proper function of some x,
i) x must be created in a process selected to produce individuals with a form F,
ii)  F itself must have been selected over alternatives because it was selected to have 
effect Z.
The etiological proper function of my eyes is to see because they were created in a process 
selected to produce individuals with the rough physiology of my eyes and that physiology 
was selected to have the effect of providing sight.27 Having an etiological proper function, 
then, is a matter of having been created in a way that relates your form to an end.
This provides the beginnings of a sketch of how we can generate constitutive functions 
or aims without accounting for them through a transfer from something else that shares the 
function or aim, as the artifactual story under consideration required. If having a constitu-
tive function is a matter of having a form with the right sort of creation story to account for 
a proper function, we could do away with the need for appeals to intentions or aims of any 
particular individual or to any minimal success criteria to account for what it is to have a con-
stitutive function or aim. This account then would hold that being a member of a functional 
kind requires a history that accounts for the relevant proper function.28 Nothing has to be 
 26 There are many individuals who have eyes that are incapable of serving their function and have no interest in 
those organs performing their function. Many blind people would not choose to become sighted and yet this 
does not change the function of their eyes. These people believe they are benefitted in important and mean-
ingful ways because of this difference, and this is almost certainly true. Yet, this also does not change the func-
tion of the eyes.
 27 See (Millikan 1989).
 28 Note, not every legal institution must share the same history or same form. It is the sameness of function that 
groups legal institutions on this account, and different histories or forms can account for this function.
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particularly good at performing a function to have it as a proper function. This is particularly 
useful to the constitutivist who wants proper functions to serve the Extension task, because 
it would permit, e.g., extremely flawed legal institutions, so long as they had the correct eti-
ological proper function.
To incorporate this approach in the legal domain, we would need to explain the con-
stitutive feature of legal institutions and show that it can satisfy the Extension and Norm 
Explanation tasks. That is, we would need to find one function or aim that all legal institutions 
share as a proper function, ensure that all legal institutions are likely to have some historical 
account that explains their having this as a proper function, and then explain the normative 
features of legal domains by appeal to this function.
Without a substantial account of the constitutive function of legal institutions, we can’t 
get far in this project, and it is well beyond the scope of the current chapter to fully defend 
a particular function for this purpose. Instead, in the remaining space, I want to accomplish 
two tasks. First, using the resources remaining from Shapiro’s Planning Theory, we will see 
how far we can get in understanding what such an account would look like. Second, we 
will assess whether such an account makes any progress where the Planning Theory seemed 
to flounder. I aim to show that it does, and that the aspiring metanormative constitutivist 
should take this success into consideration in her development of a unified metanormative 
account.
VI.  Planning Functions as Proper Functions
The metanormative constitutivist has the hard task of accounting for how specific legal 
institutions have their forms selected for whatever function legal institutions all share. Of 
course, she can’t just rest here because she doesn’t yet have a story for what, specifically, 
that function is or how, in general, legal institutions could have histories that make them 
selected to have it.29 But understanding legal institutions as evolving systems whose large- 
scale features can be understood as selected for the performance of certain functions could, 
in principle, adequately account for the extension of legal institutions.
For now, let’s assume with Shapiro that it is a constitutive function of legal institutions 
to be a particular sort of planning institution, of roughly the sort that he claims. The Moral 
Aim Thesis won’t help account for what Shapiro wants, but the constitutivist might fruit-
fully understand this planning function etiologically to address the Extension and Norm 
Explanation tasks discussed above.
First, understanding the planning function as an etiological proper function does seem 
to provide some resources that might help with the Extension task. If the aim or function is 
had as the result of having a form selected for suitedness to that function or aim, this directs 
our attention away from the actual behavior of an institution and toward its history to deter-
mine what sort of institution it is. Shapiro, of course, thought that actual planning behavior 
 29 One account could be to appeal to Hart’s transition from pre- legal to legal stages of a community’s evolution 
when the community adopts secondary rules, which establish the legal conditions under which primary rules 
can be recognized. For this account, see Hart, The Concept of Law (1994), especially ch. 5.
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was insufficient to count as a legal institution because it ruled in, e.g., the Japanese Yakuza or 
Sicilian Mafia, which engaged in planning but are not taken to be legal institutions.
But on the etiological account, planning institutions are those institutions that have forms 
selected to perform planning tasks, not necessarily those institutions that actually do perform 
those tasks. Legal institutions are, on the Planning Account, social planning organizations 
with a particular character. Shapiro writes that this social character “creates and administers 
norms that represent communal standards of behavior,” via general policies, via publicly acces-
sible standards.30 So, on the proper function account, in order for some organization to have 
this function of social planning it must have been selected to create and regulate communal 
standards that are general and publicly accessible.
Shapiro describes sophisticated crime syndicates as a form of non- legal planning 
organization:
These firms are compulsory planning organizations: their members engage in collec-
tive planning designed to further shared criminal ends, they occupy offices (for ex-
ample, the don, consigliores, capos, lieutenants, bodyguards, hitmen, and so forth), 
their normativity is institutional in nature (for example, the Yamaguchi- gumi of Japan 
has tens of thousands of members and as a result has an extremely complex hierarchal 
structure), and they do not require consent before imposing their demands on their 
victims.31
Is it at all plausible that the Japanese Yakuza or Sicilian Mafia have this organizational 
form selected for the planning function? It might be possible that these groups have a social 
planning function selected to serve a larger purpose of facilitating the criminal ends of finan-
cial success and dominance of one family or social group over the rest.32
But looking at whether they have offices, engage in compulsory planning, etc., involves 
looking at their current features, rather than why they have those current features. Though it 
isn’t obvious that all institutions that we wish to pre- theoretically rule out as potential legal 
institutions are actually ruled out by this proper function account, it certainly provides addi-
tional resources over creator and performance functional accounts. Looking to the historical 
selection process seems to provide extra resources to the constitutivist to sort the legal from 
the extralegal, i.e., to serve the Extension task.
 30 (Shapiro, 2011, 203).
 31 (Shapiro 2011, 215).
 32 I am not as convinced as Shapiro that this would be an unwelcome outcome. If it turns out that the Yakuza 
and Mafia share proper functions with legal institutions, we will likely have the resources to account for 
their serious defects qua legal institutions. Whether having the planning function for some further purpose 
was a disqualifying trait in a legal institution would then determine whether the Yakuza or Mafia were legal 
institutions. One could hold that the final proper function of legal institutions must be the social planning 
function, such that if the social planning function is instituted for some other function, the institution with 
those functions is not a legal one. I have no real objection to this sort of view, either.
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VII.  Explanatory Resources of Proper Functions
The extra resources in the etiological proper function account also aid the constitutivist in 
addressing the Norm Extension task where the Moral Aim Thesis failed. The etiological ac-
count of the planning function explains legal institutions as having the function of social pla-
nning because their form was selected to engage in the creating, carrying out, and enforcing 
of social plans for guiding and coordinating the activity of agents.
Legal institutions aren’t selected to merely issue prohibitions; they also, as we learn from 
Hart, characteristically confer powers and establish the apparatus that enables social agents 
to undertake certain statuses and obligations with respect to each other.33 Grant, for the mo-
ment, that these are part of how legal institutions are selected to fulfill their proper function; 
it’s not something they do accidentally, but something they do because they were selected 
to do it, and individual legal institutions have the shape and structure they do because that 
shape and structure was chosen to perform these functions. With this, we have additional 
resources, though we have not yet explained how we get moral or practical judgments about 
legal institutions from these facts.
Leslie Green has distinguished what he calls the internal problem of how legal institutions 
perform their given function from the external problem of the moral (or social) value of that 
function.34 This is an important distinction, because we can certainly see this having been an 
issue earlier in explaining why artifactual function does not determine the practical norms 
governing artifact users. In addition to these two problems, we might also see a third problem 
that we might call the normative internal problem of the value of how legal institutions per-
form their given function. Not only can we ask how some institution performs its function, 
and what the value of that function is, we can also ask after the value of how that institution 
achieves that function. Proper functions are uniquely set up to provide space for this last ques-
tion. The same proper function can be multiply realized by different systems that achieve it 
in varying ways.
Artifacts provide nice examples of how the same function can be realized by different 
forms. Of the many ways corkscrews can be designed to perform their proper function, 
here are two: they can use a lever- system to remove the impaled cork, and they can be set 
up to allow the force from direct pulling to remove the impaled cork. Both are ways of 
achieving the same aim of removing corks. The answer to the external question requires us 
to ask: What’s the value of removing corks? Answering this question does not require us 
to consider the answer to the internal question. However, the answer to the internal ques-
tion differs between the two cases, and so there could be different answers to the norma-
tive internal question. There might be a difference in the value of the way in which the two 
corkscrews remove corks.
Once the function of legal institutions is understood to have social agents as its object, 
the significance of this normative internal problem is clear. Given that there are numerous 
ways of engaging in social planning, the normative internal problem can lead us to ask which 
 33 (Hart 1994, 26– 78).
 34 (Green, 1998, 121– 122).
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is best, and the kind of activity that social planning is— the planning for social agents— can 
help us understand those constraints. Loading the contents of a moving van is a function 
that a person might perform, but how it’s best to load differs dramatically on whether you’re 
loading feather pillows— toss ’em in— or boxes of priceless porcelain plates— set them down 
gingerly and carefully secure them ensuring they don’t jostle. If the thing you’re planning is 
the social arrangements of people, there are constraints on what makes that arrangement a 
good one in addition to the external success of whether you end up with a social arrangement.
Unlike corks, the object of the function of corkscrews, agents, and especially social agents, 
have normative significance. This normative significance is independent of the function of 
legal institutions to engage in social planning for them. Because the social planning function 
is planning for these social agents, the normative significance of these social agents is relevant 
for addressing the normative internal problem for legal institutions. It is not a mere conse-
quence of legal activity that it affects agents that have normative standing; it is part of the 
function of legal activity that it affects these agents. So, the standards that govern how these 
agents ought to be treated is internal to the function of legal institutions, because they are 
essentially engaged in an activity that engages with these agents. Because of this, we should 
see that it’s a mistake to think that moral aims are required to help us satisfactorily answer the 
normative internal problem for legal institutions. On any plausible constitutive aim or func-
tion of legal institution, e.g., bringing individuals into political society or being a social pla-
nning organization, any form selected to perform this function will have internal normative 
standards that involve moral evaluations, because the constitutive activity of that institution 
is an instance of a more general activity that has normative standards.
Additionally, this move to a proper function account of the planning theory allows us 
to admit of legal institutions with distinctly immoral aims, more easily accounting for the 
Extension task. That is, it more easily allows for extensions that not only exclude the Yakuza, 
but that include distinctly immoral legal systems. For example, a social planning system that 
structures and coordinates social beings through the oppression of some subset of those 
beings would be a legal system without a plausible moral aim. Antebellum America had 
such a legal system. It was structured to commodify and exploit a set of those social beings 
who were governed by the system. Those of African ancestry, both free and enslaved, were 
governed by the legal system and had their obligations and rights (such as they were) struc-
tured by a system whose aim involved their oppression. It had no moral aim, yet it has a social 
planning function that could account for it being a legal system.
This also allows a useful resource to answer to the Norm Explanation task by accounting 
for how legal officials are evaluable because of the proper function of legal institutions. Norm 
Transfer cannot account for the standards legal officials are held to, but once we reject the 
Aim Transfer, we can see the activities of legal officials as standing in a special role in legal 
institutions. Legal officials, qua social agents, have the same general moral obligations to 
treat other social agents with respect, but criticism of their actions qua social agents is crit-
icism external to the normative features of the legal system. By understanding the function 
of legal institutions to be accomplished independently of it being accomplished well, we 
have recourse to an internal understanding of the moral criticism of legal officials. The ac-
tivities of legal officials, qua agents of the legal system, constitute the performance of the 
institution’s planning function, and their actions are thereby evaluable by the internal 
standards of the legal institution. The actions of legal officials done in their official capacities 
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are not normatively assessable simply because those officials are generally morally assessable 
according to moral standards external to the legal system, as they are when they go to the 
store or interact with neighbors. When legal officials are engaged in legal activities, they are 
engaged in an activity with a function that has moral standards because of the kind of activity 
it is. Looking at how the function is performed opens up the space for internal moral assess-
ment of legal institutions and legal agents, independently of any explicit or implicit moral 
aim the legal institution might have.
It seems we should then be less concerned about Shapiro’s inability to account for a dis-
tinctive constitutive moral aim of legal institutions. He adds the Moral Aim Thesis because 
he thinks it is the only way to account for the extension of legal institutions and to explain 
the prescriptive and evaluative judgments governing legal officials. But he is unable to sat-
isfactorily account for how legal institutions have moral aims, and it seems to cause rather 
than solve problems for the Extension and Norm Explanation tasks. We’ve seen, however, 
that for constitutivists willing to understand constitutive functions as etiologically under-
stood proper functions, there are more satisfying ways to address these constitutivist tasks 
for the legal domain. So, given that Shapiro has been unable to account for how the Moral 
Aim Thesis could be a constitutive aim of legal institutions, and there are alternate ways of 
accounting for at least some of the normative facts governing how legal systems function and 
legal officials operate, metanormative constitutivists have reason to turn to developing an 
account of legal institutions without constitutive moral aims.
VIII.  Conclusions for Metanormative Constitutivists
This is relevant not only to the philosopher of law, of course, but also to the interested 
metaethicist. Metaethical constitutivists interested in expanding their views to other nor-
mative domains will be interested in determining whether some feature constitutive of the 
legal domain can explain its normative features, i.e., explain the evaluative, prescriptive, and 
deontic facts in the legal domain. Shapiro provided a candidate account, but a central part 
of his planning theory, the Moral Aim Thesis, seemed both difficult to account for (be-
cause of the failure of Aim Transfer) and unable to do what was asked of it (because of the 
failure of Norm Transfer). In looking more closely at how we should understand constitutive 
functions, we saw that it is possible for the planning thesis alone to account for the Norm 
Explanation and Extension tasks that the Moral Aim Thesis was introduced to address.
By turning to etiological proper functions, we have seen that there is hope that this 
work can be accomplished without a Moral Aim Thesis. Though we were led to think 
constitutivists needed it because of a particular view of artifactual functions, according to 
which all normative features are explained by appeal to an explicit aim, this isn’t true. We 
have seen, rather, that things can have functions independently of having any intentionally 
understood aims, so long as they have a particular history that accounts for a characteristic 
function. Additionally, we saw that institutions and institutional- members can be morally 
criticized even if they do not have moral aims themselves, if those institutions have etiologi-
cally understood proper functions that constitutively involve moral subjects.
We also have dismissed the concern that because legal institutions were artifacts, their aims 
must come from the aims of their designers. Shapiro avoided the implausible commitment 
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that all legal institutions had designers who shared aims by retreating to an account based on 
an aim transfer principle. We’ve seen that the need for such an account is avoided if we can 
explain the moral normative facts in the legal domain independently of any specific moral 
aim. The aspiring metanormative theorist has examples of other normative domains that lack 
designers all together. These provide models for constitutive features that do not stipulate 
designers, but rather rely on historical accounts of form. Combined with the need to account 
for a constitutive moral aim, this should increase the metanormative theorist’s confidence 
that a constitutivist account in the legal domain is possible.
Moreover, this can help the metaethicist who was interested in the two questions that 
we began with. What is the scope of the set of normative domains, and can metaethical 
constitutivism generalize to account for every normative domain? One tentative answer to 
the first question is that there are normative domains wherever there are etiological proper 
functions, because wherever there are etiological proper functions, there are deontic facts. 
In this case, the constitutivist is well- poised to give a general account for metanormative 
constitutivism of the following form: for any domain in which there is an etiological proper 
function determining the membership in that domain, this constitutive function can be used 
to explain the normative facts governing that domain.
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